Oct 152018
 

Amitai Ziv reports:

Serious security breaches in the website of Magen David Adom, also known as MDA, have led to the leaking of identifying information about patients, sensitive medical information, financial information and even information on organization volunteers.

A so-called white hat hacker – who finds breaches to improve cybersecurity rather than to attack sites – revealed the information this week. The hacker, Eliel Hauzi, is a professional programmer and veteran of the army’s Encryption and Security Center who checks the security of websites in his free time.

Read more on Haaretz. It turns out he subsequently found yet another problem with MDA, leading them to take it completely offline for a time.

Oct 152018
 

Rachel Eddie reports:

Kitchenware brand Neoflam Australia has mistakenly published its internal warranty records, exposing the private information of more than 7500 of its customers, The New Daily can reveal.

A page under the brand’s website revealed the full name, age or age bracket, gender, phone number, home address and email of customers from between 2010 and 2015.

Read more on The New Daily.

Oct 122018
 

Here’s what appears to be a serious breach involving Google drive and syncing. Henrietta Cook reports:

Confidential files detailing high school students’ medical conditions, including anxiety issues and those at risk of suicide, have been found on a Melbourne schoolgirl’s iPad.

The document contains photos, names and medical and family details of years 7 to 12 students at Manor Lakes P-12 College in Wyndham Vale in Melbourne’s south-west.

[…]

The 14-year-old girl discovered the document on her iPad last month and said she had no idea how it got there.

Now read the following explanation from the Education Department carefully, because this looks very much like what some people reported in Springfield, Missouri Public Schools:

He said the private student information had been inadvertently shared with one student.

He said in May, the student borrowed a teacher’s laptop because she did not have her own device. The teacher sat next to the student while she completed an assignment on the borrowed computer, the spokesman said.

The student accessed her own Google documents on the machine.

The spokesman said that when the teacher later used her laptop the document they opened synced with the student’s account. This meant it turned up on the student’s own Google drive.

The spokesman said there was no evidence that private and personal school documents had been obtained by anyone other than the individual student.

But the girl’s father said that his daughter never used the teacher’s laptop.

“She doesn’t recall using a teacher’s device at all this year,” he said.

Read more on Canberra Times.  How did the teacher’s laptop sync with the student’s own Google drive? What configuration hell led to this mess? What should the district have done to prevent this from ever happening? COULD the district have prevented it or is there something in Google’s G-Suite coding that pretty much makes this kind of nightmare not only predictable but inevitable?
I’ll be reporting more on the Springfield case in the near future, but it’s interesting – albeit frustrating – that the reporting on this Melbourne case does not do a deeper dive into how this happened and how it could have been prevented – if it could have been.
I know there are those whose immediate hypothesis will be poor password hygiene or poor browser hygiene on the part of the users (in this case, the teacher). But by now, Google has to know that there’s poor password hygiene and poor browser hygiene. So why doesn’t it code take that into account enough?  Or did it take it into account but the district failed to follow directions? And how often do districts fail to configure Google products to be appropriately privacy-protective? Does Google’s coding and default settings take that into account?
Oct 122018
 

Zack Whittaker reports:

FitMetrix, a fitness technology and performance tracking company owned by gym booking giant Mindbody, has exposed millions of user records because it left several of its servers without a password.

The company builds fitness tracking software for gyms and group classes that displays heart rate and other fitness metric information for interactive workouts. FitMetrix was acquired by gym and wellness scheduling service Mindbody earlier this year for $15.3 million, according to a government filing.

Last week, a security researcher found three FitMetrix unprotected servers leaking customer data.

Read more on TechCrunch.

Oct 102018
 

Zack Whittaker reports:

Navionics, an electronic navigational chart maker owned by tech giant Garmin, has secured an exposed database that contained hundreds of thousands of customer records.

The MongoDB database wasn’t secured with a password, allowing anyone who knew where to look to access and download the data.

The company’s main products give boat, yacht and ship owners better access to real-time navigation charts, and boasts the “world’s largest cartography database.”

Bob Diachenko, Hacken.io’s newly appointed director of cyber risk research, said in a blog post that the 19 gigabyte database contained 261,259 unique records, including customer names and email addresses.

Read more on TechCrunch.