FireEye and Accellion provide more details on attack
Andrew Moore, Genevieve Stark, Isif Ibrahima, Van Ta of FireEye write:
Starting in mid-December 2020, malicious actors that Mandiant tracks as UNC2546 exploited multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Accellion’s legacy File Transfer Appliance (FTA) to install a newly discovered web shell named DEWMODE. The motivation of UNC2546 was not immediately apparent, but starting in late January 2021, several organizations that had been impacted by UNC2546 in the prior month began receiving extortion emails from actors threatening to publish stolen data on the “CL0P^_- LEAKS” .onion website. Some of the published victim data appears to have been stolen using the DEWMODE web shell.
Notably, the number of victims on the “CL0P^_- LEAKS” shaming website has increased in February 2021 with organizations in the United States, Singapore, Canada, and the Netherlands recently outed by these threat actors. Mandiant has previously reported that FIN11 has threatened to post stolen victim data on this same .onion site as an additional tactic to pressure victims into paying extortion demands following the deployment of CLOP ransomware. However, in recent CLOP extortion incidents, no ransomware was deployed nor were the other hallmarks of FIN11 present.
A number of people had commented that perhaps were not the attackers but were collaborating with the attackers somehow. FireEye’s proposed connection between FIN11 and CLOP would be consistent with such hypotheses. They write:
Key Overlaps With FIN11
UNC2582 (Extortion) and FIN11
Mandiant identified overlaps between UNC2582’s data theft extortion activity and prior FIN11 operations, including common email senders and the use of the CL0P^_- LEAKS shaming site. While FIN11 is known for deploying CLOP ransomware, we have previously observed the group conduct data theft extortion without ransomware deployment, similar to these cases.
- Some UNC2582 extortion emails observed in January 2021 were sent from IP addresses and/or email accounts used by FIN11 in multiple phishing campaigns between August and December 2020, including some of the last campaigns that were clearly attributable to the group.
- We have not observed FIN11 phishing activity in the new year. FIN11 has typically paused their phishing operations over the winter holidays and had several extended gaps in their operations. However, the timing of this current hiatus is also consistent with UNC2582’s data theft extortion activity.
- UNC2582 extortion emails contained a link to the CL0P^_- LEAKS website and/or a victim specific negotiation page. The linked websites were the same ones used to support historical CLOP operations, a series of ransomware and data theft extortion campaigns we suspect can be exclusively attributed to FIN11.
UNC2546 (FTA Exploitation and DEWMODE) and FIN11
There are also limited overlaps between FIN11 and UNC2546.
- Many of the organizations compromised by UNC2546 were previously targeted by FIN11.
- An IP address that communicated with a DEWMODE web shell was in the “Fortunix Networks L.P.” netblock, a network frequently used by FIN11 to host download and FRIENDSPEAK command and control (C2) domains.
The overlaps between FIN11, UNC2546, and UNC2582 are compelling, but we continue to track these clusters separately while we evaluate the nature of their relationships. One of the specific challenges is that the scope of the overlaps with FIN11 is limited to the later stages of the attack life cycle. UNC2546 uses a different infection vector and foothold, and unlike FIN11, we have not observed the actors expanding their presence across impacted networks. We therefore have insufficient evidence to attribute the FTA exploitation, DEWMODE, or data theft extortion activity to FIN11. Using SQL injection to deploy DEWMODE or acquiring access to a DEWMODE shell from a separate threat actor would represent a significant shift in FIN11 TTPs, given the group has traditionally relied on phishing campaigns as its initial infection vector and we have not previously observed them use zero-day vulnerabilities.
Read more of the team’s findings on FireEye.
For its part, Accellion also issued a press release today citing FIreEye’s findings.