STRATFOR wasn’t the only firm storing full credit card numbers with CVV – Who failed to guide (updated)

Three recent breach reports to the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office that flew under the media radar:

Automatic Data Processing (ADP) reported that a laptop stolen from an associate’s home contained information on A. W. Hastings‘ employees including names, addresses, and Social Security numbers. The laptop, stolen November 12, was encrypted and had a logon password, but the firm reports that it is possible that both the encryption key and password were compromised.

Aegis Science Corporation reported that a laptop and external hard drive stolen from an employee’s car contained personal information on individuals who had been tested for drugs, as well as information on the technicians who collected the data. Personal information included names, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and phone numbers. No drug test results or medical information were on either device. The laptop was password-protected but not encrypted. The external drive had no protection on it at all.

Through their lawyers, Guide Publishing Group and its web site reported that on October 28, they discovered that hackers had inserted code into their server and accessed customers’ credit card numbers. It seems that, like STRATFOR, they were also storing CVV2/CVC2/CID and expiration dates with the customers’ names, addresses, and full credit card numbers.  Doesn’t it make you wonder who’s minding the PCI-DSS compliance store?

Update 1:  As I was entering these breaches in DataLossDB, it dawned on me that not only did Publishing Group really have a major security #FAIL by storing full credit card numbers with magstripe data: (1) it took them almost a year to discover that malicious code had been inserted on their server, and (2) they didn’t offer affected customers any free credit monitoring services.  They didn’t even recommend that they cancel their account numbers, only suggesting they monitor the accounts.   The notification does not indicate how first became aware of the breach on October 28 – were they notified by a customer of fraudulent charges or did they discover the breach internally?  In reading the notification a second time, I noticed that they never actually said whether there were any reports of misuse of data or not.

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